<span id="page-0-0"></span>

# <span id="page-1-0"></span>Table of Contents



# Evolution of the AIPW estimator

We will talk about the **AIPW**-style estimator [\(Robins and Rotnitzky](#page-40-0) [1995\)](#page-40-0) in causal inferences.

- Estimating **ATE** and **ATET** for cross-sectional data:
	- ▶ Low-dimensional/parametric settings [\(Robins and Rotnitzky 1995\)](#page-40-0)
	- ▶ High-dimensional/semiparametric settings [\(Farrell 2015](#page-39-0) and [Chernozhukov et al. 2018\)](#page-39-1)
- Difference-in-differences for panel data:
	- ▶ Homogeneous **ATET** [\(Sant'Anna and Zhao 2020\)](#page-40-1)
	- ▶ Heterogeneous **ATET** [\(Callaway and Sant'Anna 2021\)](#page-39-2)
- Heterogeneous treatment effects [\(Semenova and Chernozhukov](#page-40-2) [2021,](#page-40-2) [Knaus 2022,](#page-39-3) and [Kennedy 2023\)](#page-39-4)

# The **AIPW** estimators in Stata

- Estimating **ATE** and **ATET** for cross-sectional data:
	- ▶ Low-dimensional/parametric settings (teffects aipw)
	- $\blacktriangleright$  High-dimensional/semiparametric settings (telasso)
- Difference-in-differences for panel data:
	- ▶ Homogeneous **ATET** (user-written drdid)
	- **Heterogeneous ATET** (xthdidregress and hdidregress)
- $\bullet$  Heterogeneous treatment effects (I will show some examples)<br> $\overbrace{A}^{\text{max}}$

# <span id="page-4-0"></span>Table of Contents



# Example: 401(k) eligibility effects

We want to know the average treatment effects (ATE) of the 401(k) eligibility on the personal net financial assets [\(Chernozhukov et al.](#page-39-1) [2018\)](#page-39-1):

 $ATE = E[Y(1) - Y(0)]$ 

where

- Treatment is 401(k) eligibility status
- Outcome is the personal net financial assets
- $Y(1) \equiv$  potential outcome if being eligible for 401(k)
- $Y(0) \equiv$  potential outcome if being not eligible for 401(k)

Fundamental missing data problem: only one of *Y*(1) or *Y*(0) is observed for each individual.

# Key assumptions to identify the ATE

**Conditional independence**: Conditional on a set of control variables, the potential outcomes are independent of the treatment assignment.

 $\implies$  We can use the observed outcome in the treated group as a proxy to estimate the treated potential outcome in the control group, and vice versa.

=⇒ Use *E*[*Y*|*treat* = 1, *X*] to estimate *E*[*Y*(1)|*treat* = 0, *X*]

**Overlap**: There is always a positive probability that any given unit is treated or untreated.

=⇒ We can always find similar units (same value of *X*) in both treated and control groups.

**• I.I.D**: identically independent distributed observations.  $\implies$  Unit *i* does not interfere with unit *j* (∀*i*  $\neq$  *j*)

### The model in a potential-outcome framework

The model is

$$
y = g(\tau, \mathbf{x}) + u, \quad \mathbb{E}[u|\mathbf{x}, \tau] = 0
$$

$$
\tau = m(\mathbf{x}) + v, \quad \mathbb{E}[v|\mathbf{x}, \tau] = 0
$$

where

- *v* is the observed outcome
- $\bullet$   $\tau$  is the treatment status (1 treated, 0 untreated)
- $\bullet$  *g*(1, **x**) ≡  $E[Y(1)|\mathbf{x}]$  and *g*(0, **x**) ≅  $E[Y(0)|\mathbf{x}]$
- $m(x) \equiv Pr[\tau = 1|x]$  (propensity score)

**ATE** =  $\mathbb{E}[Y(1) - Y(0)] = \mathbb{E}[\mathbb{E}[Y(1)|\mathbf{x}] - \mathbb{E}[Y(0)|\mathbf{x}]]^{\mathbb{V}} = \mathbb{E}[g(1,\mathbf{x}) - g(0,\mathbf{x})]$ 

# The AIPW [\(Robins and Rotnitzky 1995\)](#page-40-0) estimator

ATE = 
$$
\mathbb{E}[Y(1, \mathbf{x})_{AIPW} - Y(0, \mathbf{x})_{AIPW}]
$$
  
\n
$$
Y(1, \mathbf{x})_{AIPW} = g(f(\mathbf{x}) + \frac{\tau(y - g(1, \mathbf{x}))}{m(\mathbf{x})}
$$
\n
$$
Y(0, \mathbf{x})_{AIPW} = g(0, \mathbf{x}) + \frac{(1 - \tau)(y - g(0, \mathbf{x}))}{n}
$$
\nATE =  $\mathbb{E}[g(1, \mathbf{x}) - g(0, \mathbf{x})]$ 

where

Notice that

The red terms are Agumented terms using the Inverse of Probability Weighting; thus **AIPW** was born.

# Example: 401(k) eligibility



Sorted by: e401k

Outcome: assets Treatment: e401k

#### teffects aipw



## The double robustness

The **AIPW** estimator is **doubly robust**: only one of the treatment or outcome model needs to be correctly specified for consistent estimation of **ATE**.

Suppose that only the treatment model is correctly specified. Let  $\hat{g}(\tau, \mathbf{x})$  be an incorrect outcome model.

$$
\mathbb{E}[Y(1, \mathbf{x})_{AIPW}|\mathbf{x}] \mathbb{E}[\frac{\hat{q}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x})}{m(\mathbf{x})}|\mathbf{x}]
$$
  
\nThen 
$$
\mathbb{E}\left[\frac{\tau(y-\hat{g}(1, \mathbf{x}))}{m(\mathbf{x})}|\mathbf{x}\right]
$$
 is  
\n
$$
Pr[\tau = 1|\mathbf{x}] * \mathbb{E}\left[\frac{y-\hat{g}(1, \mathbf{x})}{m(\mathbf{x})}|\mathbf{x}, \tau = 1\right] = \mathbb{E}[y|\mathbf{x}|\tau = 0|\mathbf{x}] * 0
$$
  
\n
$$
= m(\mathbf{x}) \mathbb{E}\left[\frac{y-\hat{g}(1, \mathbf{x})}{m(\mathbf{x})}|\mathbf{x}, \tau = 1\right] = \mathbb{E}[y|\mathbf{x}|\tau = 1] - \hat{g}(1, \mathbf{x})
$$

# The double robustness (continued)

$$
\mathbb{E}[Y(1, \mathbf{x})_{\text{AIPW}}|\mathbf{x}] = \hat{g}(1, \mathbf{x}) + \mathbb{E}[y|\mathbf{x}, \tau = 1] - \hat{g}(1, \mathbf{x})
$$
\n
$$
= \mathbb{E}[y|\mathbf{x}, \tau = 1]
$$
\n
$$
= \mathbb{E}[Y(1)|\mathbf{x}, \tau = 1]
$$
\n
$$
= \mathbb{E}[X(1)|\mathbf{x}]
$$

where the last equality comes from the assumption of conditional independence. Similarly,  $\mathbb{E}[Y(0, \mathbf{X})_{\mathbf{A}PW}|\mathbf{X}] = \mathbb{E}[Y(0)|\mathbf{X}].$ Thus,

 $E[Y(1, \mathbf{x})_{AIPW} - Y(1, \mathbf{x})_{AIPW}] = E[E[Y(1) - Y(0)]\mathbf{x}] = E[Y(1) - Y(0)]$ 

even if the outcome model is incorrectly specified.

# <span id="page-13-0"></span>Table of Contents



### More vs. fewer variables

We want to estimate the treatment effects of 401(k) eligibility on financial assets, but we have the following dilemma:

- On the one hand, we think a simple specification may not be adequate to control for the related confounders. So we need more variables or flexible models.
	- =⇒ ▶ Adding interactions among variables as controls.
		- $\triangleright$  Generating B-splines of continuous variables as controls.
		- ▶ There are many raw variables.
- On the other hand, flexible models decrease the power to learn about the treatment effects. So we need fewer variables or simple models.  $\implies$  The model may not converge!

### Set controls

.

.

.

. //---- orthogonal polynomial ----//

- . orthpoly age, degree(6) generate(\_orth\_age\*)
- . orthpoly income, degree(8) generate( orth inc\*)
- . orthpoly educ, degree(4) generate(\_orth\_educ\*)

 $//---$  define controls

- . global cvars \_orth\*
- . global fvars pension married twoearn ira ownhome
- . global controls2 \$cvars i.(\$fvars) c.(\$cvars)#i.(\$fvars) ///
- > i.(\$fvars)#i.(\$fvars)

There are 248 controls and 9913 observations.<br>Child Child C

# Include all the controls?

. cap noi teffects aipw (assets \$controls2) (e401k \$controls2) treatment model has **5** observations completely determined; the model, as specified, is not identified

- Including too many controls will violate the overlap [assumption!](#page-0-0)
- In practice, to avoid conflicts, researchers usually do some sort of model selection, but they conduct inference as if there is no model selection or assuming the selected model is correct!
	- ▶ It is mostly dangerous! Very! [\(Leeb and Pötscher 2005,](#page-39-5) [2008\)](#page-40-3)<br>  $\begin{pmatrix} \sqrt{1/2} & \sqrt{1/2} \\ \sqrt{1/2} & \sqrt{1/2} \end{pmatrix}$

# Conflits between the C.I. and overlap assumptions

- **Conditional independence:**  $\mathbb{E}(y(\tau)|\mathbf{x},\tau) = \mathbb{E}(y(\tau)|\mathbf{x}).$ Dependent on a set of control variables, the potential outcome is independent of the treatment assignment.
- **Overlap**:  $m_0(z) > 0$ . There is always a positive probability that any given unit is treated or untreated.

#### **Conflicts**

- The more covariates we have, the easier the CI assumption is satisfied.
- Certain specific values of covariates may not be observed in some treatment groups, which means the violation of the overlap assumption.

### Honestly solve the conflicts

- We need to select variables that matter to outcome and treatment. We only need some of them!
- The inference should be robust to model-selection mistakes. We admit that we made the model selection and that we may select the wrong variables. **→ Neyman orthognality** A Neyman orthogonal moment condition is defined as

 $4.5\%$ 

$$
\mathbb{E}[\psi(\mathbf{W},\theta_0,\eta_0)]=0\\\cdot D_0[\eta]\eta_0]=0\\\cdot\frac{p}{\sqrt{2}}\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\eta_0
$$

where

$$
D_r[\eta-\eta_0]=\partial_r\left\{\mathbb{E}\left[\psi(W;\theta_0;\eta_0+\hat{\eta}_T(\eta-\eta_0)r)\right]\right\}
$$

for all  $r \in [0,1)$ . When  $D_r$  is evaluated at  $r \leq 0$ , we denote it as  $D_0[\eta - \eta_0]$ 

### Treatment effects + lassos

$$
\text{ATE} = \mathbb{E}\left[Y(1, \mathbf{x})_{\text{AIPW}} - Y(0, \mathbf{x})_{\text{AIPW}}\right]
$$

where

$$
Y(1, \mathbf{x})_{AIPW} = g(1, \mathbf{x}) + \frac{\tau(\mathbf{y} - g(1, \mathbf{x}))}{m(\mathbf{x})}
$$

$$
Y(0, \mathbf{x})_{AIPW} = g(0, \mathbf{x}) + \frac{(1 - \tau)(\mathbf{y} - g(0, \mathbf{x}))}{1 - m(\mathbf{x})}
$$

- $\bullet$  We use lasso-type techniques to predict  $g(1, \mathbf{x})$ ,  $g(0, \mathbf{x})$ , and  $m(\mathbf{x})$ .
- $\bullet$  It is just a version of teffects aipw with lassos.
- It is doubly robust, i.e., either the outcome or treatment model can be misspecified.
- It is Neyman orthogonal; it is robust to model-selection mistakes (Not RA or IPW estimators).

#### telasso



On average, being eligible for a 401(k) will increase financial assets by \$8408.

# <span id="page-21-0"></span>Table of Contents



# Double machine learning

Double machine learning means cross-fitting + resampling.

#### **Why do we need it?**

- Cross-fitting relaxes the requirements in the sparsity assumption.
	- ▶ **Without cross-fitting**, the sparsity assumption requires

where  $s_q$  and  $s_m$  are the number of actual terms in the outcome and treatment models, respectively.

 $s_{g}^2 + s_{m}^2 \ll N$ 

 $s_q * s_m \ll N$ 

▶ **With cross-fitting**, the sparsity assumption requires

Resampling reduces the randomness in cross-fitting.

# Basic idea of double machine learning

$$
ATE = \mathbb{E}\left(g(1, \mathbf{x}) + \frac{\tau\left(\mathbf{y} - g(1, \mathbf{x})\right)}{m(\mathbf{z})}\right)
$$

$$
= \mathbb{E}\left(g(0, \mathbf{x}) + \frac{(1 - \tau)\left(\mathbf{y} - g(0, \mathbf{x})\right)}{1 - m(\mathbf{z})}\right)
$$

#### **Basic idea**

- **1** Split sample into auxiliary part and main part;
- All the machine-learning techniques are applied to the auxiliary sample;
- All the post-lasso residuals are obtained from the main sample:
- <sup>4</sup> **Switch the role of auxiliary sample and main sample**, and do steps 2 and 3 again;
- **5** Solve the moment equation using the full sample.

# 2-fold cross-fitting (I)



# 2-fold cross-fitting (II)



# Cross-fitting



# Cross-fitting + resampling



# <span id="page-28-0"></span>Table of Contents

**[Evolution of the AIPW estimator](#page-1-0) [The basics](#page-4-0)** Adding high-dimensional theory of the Matter of the Matter of the Heterogeneous treatment effects of the China oppendix: Proofs [Double machine learning](#page-21-0) 5 [Heterogeneous treatment effects](#page-28-0) [Appendix: Proofs](#page-41-0)

### Heterogeneous treatment effects

- So far, we focus on measuring the **ATE**, but a single mean is not good enough to summarize the treatment effects.
- We want to understand the driving mechanism underlying the treatment effects.  $\Longrightarrow$  *Who is* benefitting more or less?

For example, we want to know how the treatment effects of 401(k) eligibility vary with education or income categories.<br>  $\mathscr{A}_{\mathscr{A}_{\mathscr{A}_{\mathscr{A}}}}$ 

Another look at the AIPW estimator

 $\Gamma(\mathbf{x}) \equiv Y(1, \mathbf{x})_{AIPW} - Y(0, \mathbf{x})_{AIPW} = \mathbb{E}[\text{treatment effects}|\mathbf{x}]$ 

$$
ATE = \mathbb{E} [\Gamma(\mathbf{x})]
$$

$$
ATET = \mathbb{E} \left[ \Gamma(\mathbf{x}) \middle| \tau = 1 \right]
$$

Then, the ATE over the subgroups  $G = g$  is just

$$
\mathbb{E}\left[\Gamma(x)\middle|\stackrel{\mathbb{Q}}{\textbf{G}}\right]\stackrel{\text{def}}{\underset{\textbf{G}_{\text{c}}}{\textbf{G}}}\mathbb{P}\left(\textbf{G}_{\text{c}}\right)
$$

Similarly, the ATE over a specific value of continuous variable  $Z = z$  is

$$
\mathbb{E}\left[\Gamma(\mathbf{x})\bigg|Z=z\right]
$$

# Estimating strategies

**Group ATE**

$$
\mathbb{E}\left[\Gamma(\mathbf{x})\bigg|G=g\right]
$$

- <sup>1</sup> We already have an estimate of Γ(**x**) after teffects aipw or telasso =⇒ use predict ..., te to construct Γ(**x**).
- **2 Run** regress Γ(x) i.

**ATE over a continuous variable**

<sup>1</sup> Run npregress series Γ(**x**) Z.

E  $\sqrt{ }$ Γ(**x**) ¢ Ť  $\overline{1}$  $\overline{\phantom{a}}$ *Z* = *z* ł

See discussions in [Semenova and Chernozhukov \(2021\)](#page-40-2), [Knaus](#page-39-3) [\(2022\)](#page-39-3), and [Kennedy \(2023\)](#page-39-4).

### Example: Treatment effects for each income group

. // ---- fit model ----// . qui teffects aipw (assets \$controls) (e401k \$controls) .<br>. // ---- predict treatment effects ---- // . predict myte, te . .  $//$  ---- income group ---. table incomecat, stat(min income) stat(max income) /// > stat(median income) nototal Minimum value Maximum value Median incomecat 0 0 17196 12240 1 17214 26523 21735 2 26526 37275 31482 3 37296 53841 44379 4 53844 242124

### Example: Treatment effects for each income group

. regress myte ibn.incomecat, noconstant

Source	SS	df	<b>MS</b>		Number of obs	$=$	9,913
					F(5, 9908)	$=$	17.06
Model	1.1208e+12	5	2.2416e+11		Prob > F	$=$	0.0000
Residual	1.3020e+14	9,908	1.3141e+10		R-squared	$=$	0.0085
					Adj R-squared	$=$	0.0080
Total	1.3132e+14	9,913	1.3247e+10		Root MSE	$=$	$1.1e + 05$
	Coefficient	Std. err.		P >  t			[95% conf. interval]
myte			t				
incomecat							
0	3748.291	2575.567	1.46	0.146	$-1300.345$		8796.927
1	1035.475	2573.619	0.40	0.687	$-4009.343$		6080.293
$\overline{c}$	5509.986	2574.918	2.14	0.032	462.6239		10557.35
3	8749.087	2574, 268	3.40	0.001	3702.997		13795.18
4	21052.43	2574.268	$8 - 18$	0.000	16006.34		26098.51
. test 4.incomecat = $3.inconnect = 2.inconnect$ , metal, metal (bonferroni)							
(1) $-3.inconnect + 4.inconnect = 0$							
(2) $-2.inconnect + 4.inconnect = 0$							
	F(df, 9908) df	p > F					
(1)	11.42	$\mathbf{1}$ $0.0015*$					
(2)	18.22	$0.0000*$ 1					
All	10.14	$\overline{2}$ 0.0000					

\* Bonferroni-adjusted p-values

### Example: Treatment effects over education



The marginal effect of education (in years) on the 401(k) eligibility treatment effects is \$415.

### Example: Treatment effects over education



### Example: Treatment effects over education

. marginsplot

Variables that uniquely identify margins: **educ**



### Example: Linear projection of treatment effects

. regress myte educ age income i.(married ownhome twoearn)



# **Summary**

- AIPW estimator in the classical settings (teffects aipw).
- **High-dimensional controls (telasso).**
- Use AIPW scores to estimate the heterogeneous treatment effects. (Note: In the ideal case, we can construct the AIPW scores using cross-fitting. It would require some programming.)
- In the heterogeneous DID settings, AIPW also plays an important role. (See xthdidregress and hdidregress from last year's talk.) talk.)

#### **References**

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$$
\begin{array}{c}\n\frac{1}{2} \frac{1}{2} \frac{
$$

# <span id="page-41-0"></span>Table of Contents



# Proofs for Neyman orthognality and double robustness of the AIPW ATE estimator

Di Liu

 $\operatorname{StataCorp}$ 

# Contents



### 0.1 Proof for ATE score is Neyman orthogonal

We need to prove the moment condition is zero at true parameters, and also this moment condition is robust to machine learning mistakes.

Step 1: we need to prove  $\mathbb{E}[\psi(W; \theta_0, \eta_0)] = 0$ 

Proof.

$$
\mathbb{E}[\psi(W; \theta_0, \eta_0)] = \mathbb{E}[(g_0(1, X) - g_0(0, X))] + \mathbb{E}\left[\frac{D(Y - g_0(1, X))}{m_0(X)}\right] - \mathbb{E}\left[\frac{(1 - D)(Y - g_0(0, X))}{1 - m_0(X)}\right] - \theta_0
$$

Where the second and third term are zero. The second term is

$$
\mathbb{E}\left[\frac{D(Y - g_0(1, X))}{m_0(X)}\right] = Pr(D = 0) * 0 + Pr(D = 1) \mathbb{E}\left[\frac{D(Y - g_0(1, X))}{m_0(X)}\middle| D = 1\right]
$$

$$
= Pr(D = 1) \mathbb{E}\left[\mathbb{E}\left(\frac{D(Y - g_0(1, X))}{m_0(X)}\middle| D = 1, X\right)\right]
$$

$$
= Pr(D = 1) \mathbb{E}\left[\frac{D}{m_0(X)} \mathbb{E}\left(Y - g_0(1, X)\middle| D = 1, X\right)\right]
$$

Notice E  $\sqrt{ }$  $Y - g_0(1, X)$  $\begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \end{array} \end{array} \end{array}$  $D = 1, X$  = 0, so  $\mathbb{E}\left[\frac{D(Y - g_0(1,X))}{m_0(X)}\right]$  $m_0(X)$  $\Big] = 0.$ 1

The third term is

$$
\mathbb{E}\left[\frac{(1-D)(Y-g_0(0,X))}{1-m_0(X)}\right] = Pr(D=0) \mathbb{E}\left[\frac{1(Y-g_0(0,X))}{1-m_0(X)}\Big|D=0\right] + Pr(D=1) * 0
$$
\n
$$
\mathbb{E}\left[\mathbb{E}\left(\frac{1(Y-g_0(0,X))}{1-m_0(X)}\Big|D=0,X\right)\right]
$$
\nNotice that 
$$
\mathbb{E}\left(Y-g_0(0,X)\Big|D=0,\mathbf{X}\right) = \mathbb{E}\left[\mathbb{E}\left(\frac{1-Y-g_0(0,X)}{1-m_0(X)}\Big|D=0,X\right)\right]
$$
\nNotice that 
$$
\mathbb{E}\left(Y-g_0(0,X)\Big|D=0,\mathbf{X}\right) = \mathbb{E}\left[\mathbb{E}\left(\mathbb{E}\left(\frac{1-D)(Y-g_0(0,X)}{1-m_0(X)}\right)\Big|B=0\right).
$$
\nBy the definition of  $\theta_0 = \mathbb{E}\left[g_0(1,X) - g_0(0,X)\mathbb{E}\left[\psi(W;\theta_0,\eta_0)\right]=0$ .\n\nStep 2: we need to prove  $D_0[\eta-\eta_0] = 0$ \n
$$
\mathbb{E}[\psi(W;\theta,\eta_0+(\eta-\eta_0)\gamma)] = \mathbb{E}[(g_0(1,X) + (g(1,X) - g_0(0,X))\gamma)] - \mathbb{E}[(g_0(0,X) + (g(0,X) - g_0(0,X))\gamma)]
$$
\n
$$
+ \mathbb{E}\left[\frac{D(Y - (g_0(1,X) + (g(1,X) - g_0(1,X))\gamma)}{(m_0(X) + (m(X) - m_0(X))\gamma)}\right] - \mathbb{E}\left[\frac{(1-D)(Y - (g_0(0,X) + (g(0,X) - g_0(0,X))\gamma)}{1-(m_0(X) + (m(X) - m_0(X))\gamma)}\right]
$$

 $\Box$ 

Under some regularity conditions, the derivative and expectation operator are interchangeable. So  $D_0[\eta-\eta_0]$  is

$$
D_0[\eta - \eta_0] = \partial_\gamma \left\{ \mathbb{E}[\psi(W; \theta, \eta_0 + (\eta - \eta_0)\gamma)] \right\}_{{\gamma = 0}}
$$
  
\n
$$
= \mathbb{E}[(g(1, X) - g_0(1, X))] - E[(g(0, X) - g_0(0, X))]
$$
  
\n
$$
- \mathbb{E}\left[\frac{D(g(1, X) - g_0(1, X))}{m_0(X)}\right]
$$
  
\n
$$
- \mathbb{E}\left[\frac{D(Y - g_0(1, X))(m(X) - m_0(X))}{m_0(X)^2}\right]
$$
  
\n
$$
+ \mathbb{E}\left[\frac{(1 - D)(g(0, X) - g_0(0, X))}{1 - m_0(X)}\right]
$$
  
\n
$$
- \mathbb{E}\left[\frac{(1 - D)(Y - g_0(0, X))(m(X) - m_0(X))}{(1 - m_0(X))^2}\right]
$$

Notice that

$$
\mathbb{E}\left[\frac{D(g(1,X)-g_0(1,X))}{m_0(X)}\right] = \mathbb{E}\left\{\mathbb{E}\left[\frac{D(g(1,X)-g_0(1,X))}{m_0(X)}\Big|X\right]\right\}
$$
\n
$$
= \mathbb{E}\left\{\mathbb{E}(D|X)\frac{(g(1,X)-g_0(1,X))}{m_0(X)}\right\}
$$
\n
$$
= \mathbb{E}\left\{m_0(X)\frac{(g(1,X)-g_0(1,X))}{m_0(X)}\right\}
$$
\n
$$
= \mathbb{E}\left\{m_0(X)\frac{(g(1,X)-g_0(1,X))}{m_0(X)}\right\}
$$

similarly

$$
\mathbb{E}\left[\frac{(1-D)(g(0,X)-g_0(0,\mathbf{X}))}{1-m_0(X)}\right]=\mathbb{E}\left[\left(g(0,X)-g_0(0,X)\right)\right]
$$

Now

$$
\mathbb{E}\left[\frac{D(Y - g_0(1, X))(m(X) - m_0(X))}{m_0(X)^2}\right]
$$
\n
$$
= Pr(D = 0) * 0 + Pr(D = 1) \mathbb{E}\left[\frac{D(Y - g_0(1, X))(m(X) - m_0(X))}{m_0(X)^2}\Big| D = 1\right]
$$
\n
$$
= Pr(D = 1) \mathbb{E}\left\{\mathbb{E}\left[\frac{D(Y - g_0(1, X))(m(X) - m_0(X))}{m_0(X)^2}\Big| D = 1, X\right]\right\}
$$
\n
$$
= Pr(D = 1) \mathbb{E}\left\{\frac{D(m(X) - m_0(X))}{m_0(X)^2}\mathbb{E}\left[Y - g_0(1, X)\Big| D = 1, X\right]\right\}
$$

But E  $\sqrt{ }$  $Y - g_0(1, X)$   $D = 1, X$  = 0, so  $\mathbb{E}\left[\frac{D(Y - g_0(1,X))(m(X) - m_0(X))}{m_0(X)^2}\right]$  $\frac{X)(m(X)-m_0(X))}{m_0(X)^2} = 0.$ Similarly,

$$
\mathbb{E}\left[\frac{(1-D)(Y-g_0(0,X))(m(X)-m_0(X))}{(1-m_0(X))^2}\right]
$$
\n
$$
=Pr(D=1)*0+Pr(D=0)\mathbb{E}\left[\frac{(1-D)(Y-g_0(0,X))(m(X)-m_0(X))}{(1-m_0(X))^2}\Big|D=0\right]
$$
\n
$$
=Pr(D=0)\mathbb{E}\left\{\mathbb{E}\left[\frac{(1-D)(Y-g_0(0,X))(m(X)-m_0(X))}{(1-m_0(X))^2}\Big|D=0,X\right]\right\}
$$
\n
$$
=Pr(D=0)\mathbb{E}\left\{\frac{(1-D)(m(X)-m_0(X))}{(1-m_0(X))^2}\mathbb{E}[Y-g_0(0,X)|D=0,X]\right\}
$$
\n
$$
\left[\frac{(1-D)(Y-g_0(0,X))(m(X)-m_0(X))}{(1-m_0(X))^2}\right]\mathbb{E}[Y-g_0(0,X)|D=0,X]\right\}
$$

But E  $Y - g_0(0, X)$   $D = 0, X$  = 0, so  $\mathbb{E}\left[\frac{(1-D)(Y-g_0(0,X))(m(X)-m_0(X))}{(1-m_0(X))^2}\right]$  $(1-m_0(X))^2$  $\Big] = 0$ So indeed,  $D_0[\eta - \eta_0] = 0$ 

 $\Box$ 

#### 0.2 Unconfoundness and overlap assumptions

Assumption 1. Unconfoundness assumption: Conditional on  $X$ , the treatment assignment mechanism is independent of the potential outcome. A weaker version of this assumption is the conditional mean independence. Which is

$$
E(y_0|X,D) = E(y_0|X) \tag{1}
$$

$$
\mathbb{E}(y_1|X,D) = \mathbb{E}(y_1|X)
$$
\n(2)

That is  $g_0(0, X) = E(y_0|X)$  and  $g_1(1, X) = E(y_1|X)$ .

Assumption 2. Overlap assumption:  $0 < Pr(D|X)$ 

These two assumptions are needed for identification of our estimators.

- The unconfoundness assumption allows us to use  $\mathbb{E}(y|\mathbf{X}, D = 0)$  to replace  $\mathbb{E}(y_0|X)$ , and use  $\mathbb{E}(y|X, D = 1)$  to replace  $\mathbb{E}(y_1|X)$ . This means we can use the observed outcome to learn the conditional mean of the potential outcome.
- The overlap assumption allows  $\theta = \mathbb{E}(\mathbb{E}(y_1|X) \mathbb{E}(y_0|X))$

The observed outcome y can be written as  $y = y_0 + D(y_1 - y_0)$ .

$$
\mathbb{E}(y|X, D) = \mathbb{E}(y_0 + D(y_1 - y_0)|X, D)
$$
  
=  $\mathbb{E}(y_0|X, D) + D[\mathbb{E}(y_1|X, D) - \mathbb{E}(y_0|X, D)]$   
=  $\mathbb{E}(y_0|X) + D[\mathbb{E}(y_1|X) - \mathbb{E}(y_0|X)]$ 

where the third equality comes from the unconfoundness assumptions. If  $D = 1$ ,  $\mathbb{E}(y|X, D = 1)$  $1) = \mathbb{E}(y_1|X);$  if  $D = 0$ ,  $\mathbb{E}(y|X, D = 0) = \mathbb{E}(y_0|X).$ 

Notice that in order to compute ATE or ATET, we need  $g_0(1, X) = \mathbb{E}(y_1|X)$ . By unconfoundness assumption, we can use the observed outcome variable moment  $\mathbb{E}(y|X, D = 1)$  to get  $\mathbb{E}(y_1|X)$ .

The ATE is an expecation over population, so the overlap assumption guarantees that  $\theta =$  $\mathbb{E}(\mathbb{E}(y|X, D=1) - \mathbb{E}(y|X, D=0))$  is identifiable.

#### 0.3 Proof for ATE estimator is doubly robust

Proof.

$$
\theta_0 = \left[ \mathbb{E}(g_0(1, X)) + \mathbb{E}\left(\frac{D(Y - g_0(1, X))}{m_0(X)}\right) \right]
$$

$$
- \left[ \mathbb{E}(g_0(0, X)) + \mathbb{E}\left(\frac{(1 - D)(Y - g_0(0, X))}{1 - m_0(X)}\right) \right]
$$

Let's consider two scenarios. First, assume that the outcome model is correctly specified, so  $g_0(0, X) = E(Y|X, D = 0)$  and  $g_0(1, X) = E(X|X, D = 1)$ . Then the second term and and the fourth term are zero. They have already been proved in the proof of Neyman orthogonality in 0.1. So  $\theta_0$  is indeed ATE.

Second, assume that the only the propensity score model is correctly specified, so  $\mathbb{E}(D|X) =$  $m_0(X)$ .

$$
\mathbb{E}\left(\frac{D(Y-g_0(1,X))}{m_0(X)}\right) = \Pr(D=1) \mathbb{E}\left[\mathbb{E}\left(\frac{(Y-g_0(1,X))}{m_0(X)}\Big|X,D=1\right)\right]
$$

$$
= \Pr(D=1) \mathbb{E}\left[\frac{1}{m_0(X)}(\mathbb{E}(Y|X,D=1) - g_0(1,X))\right]
$$

$$
= \mathbb{E}\left[\frac{D}{m_0(X)}(\mathbb{E}(Y_1|X) - g_0(1,X))\right]
$$

$$
= \mathbb{E}\left[\frac{\mathbb{E}(D|X)}{m_0(X)}(\mathbb{E}(Y_1|X) - g_0(1,X))\right]
$$

$$
= \mathbb{E}(Y_1) - \mathbb{E}(g_0(1,X))
$$

Similarly, we can prove that  $\mathbb{E}\left(\frac{(1-D)(Y-g_0(0,X))}{1-m_0(X)}\right)$  $= \mathbb{E}(Y_0) - E(g_0(0, X)).$  So again  $\theta_0 = \mathbb{E}(Y_1) 1-m_0(X)$  $E(Y_0)$ .  $\Box$ 

The above proof also sheds light on how to compute the potential outcome. To preserve the double robustness, we need to compute  $\mathbb{E}(Y_1)$  and  $\mathbb{E}(Y_0)$  by inverse probability adjustment. Specifically,

$$
\mathbb{E}(Y_1) = \mathbb{E}(g_0(1, X)) + \mathbb{E}\left(\frac{D(Y - g_0(1, X))}{m_0(X)}\right)
$$

$$
\mathbb{E}(Y_0) = \mathbb{E}(g_0(0, X)) + \mathbb{E}\left(\frac{(1 - D)(Y - g_0(0, X))}{1 - m_0(X)}\right)
$$